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Throughout the world, people organize much of their lives
through households, which range from large intergenerational
groups of related individuals to individuals raising children
alone. Households are a basic institution in every society,
although the exact form diﬀers across time and location. Yet
the models of household behavior and decision making typi-
cally fall into two categories. Either the household is treated
as a single entity, with one set of preferences, or it is modeled
as two separate individuals, each acting within their own best
interest. Neither of these extremes adequately helps us to
understand the complex set of relationships within house-
holds, where individuals make decisions based not only on
their own self-interest but also on the interests of others.
Households frequently involve more than just two people.
While social scientists have noted that households are the loca-
tion of both cooperation and conﬂict (e.g., Sen, 1990), frame-
works have not yet been developed to analyze the conditions
under which households work collectively to meet the needs
of individual members and when they fail to do so.
A growing literature, much of it focused on natural resource
management (NRM), explores the conditions under which
groups are able to work together for a common goal and when
they fail. They ask what aﬀects the costs and returns to such
collective action. Yet, this literature has not explored one of
the most common forms of collective action institution: the
household.
In this paper, we bring together these two sets of literature. 1
Drawing on the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) Framework that was originally developed for the col-
lective action in NRM literature, we explore the factors that
encourage and inhibit collective action, both within resource
management groups and within households. Considering
households as institutions in the context of the IAD frame-
work raises questions including, ‘Given the same resource
levels, why are some households better than others at provi-
sioning and caring for their members?’ We also ask what
insights or directions the collective action literature might gain
from the household and intrahousehold literatures. 2 This171pushes the collective action literature in new directions as well.
By using the collective action framework to explore household
decision-making, we enrich both bodies of knowledge, raise
new questions, and point to directions for future research.2. ANALYSES OF HOUSEHOLDS AND INTRAHOUSE-
HOLD RELATIONS
Households face many collective action problems. House-
hold members must work together to produce livelihoods,
which may include producing food and goods for home con-
sumption or the market and selling labor for a wage. In addi-
tion, household members must allocate the goods that they
produce and purchase among themselves. These include both
public goods within the household and private goods for indi-
vidual members.
Many models of the household treat the household as the
decision-making unit. Analytically, this assumes either that
all household members have the same preferences, pool all
resources, and agree on all decisions, or that one household
member makes the decisions for everyone. 3 Implicitly, these
models assume that the collective action problem has been
solved.
One set of innovations in household models was to include
both production and consumption, initially through agricul-
tural household models (e.g., Singh, Squire, & Strauss, 1986)
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decide how much to produce, and then allocate what is pro-
duced across public and private household goods). Extensions
of the models explored the linkages between these decisions.
For example, consumption decisions, such as food allocation
or health care expenditure, may impact production.
The women in development literature provided initial evi-
dence that households did not necessarily make joint decisions
and that men’s and women roles and responsibilities impacted
production decisions. 4 While this literature initially focused
on demonstrating that ignoring gender roles could result in
ineﬃcient outcomes for projects, it also had implications for
understanding how households behave and how gender roles
and power dynamics shape household decisions.
The literature on health, education, and nutrition raised
issues of resource allocation within households. Questions
about how to target resources to speciﬁc household members
led researchers to analyze intrahousehold consumption. Girls
and boys often receive diﬀerent levels of nutrition and educa-
tion and the bargaining power of men and women within the
household impacts the allocations. 5
An extensive literature considers that individual household
members may have diﬀerent preferences and diﬀerent abilities
to impact outcomes. 6 Much of this uses a game theoretic
framework. Collective models of the household begin with
the assumption that the household will reach an eﬃcient out-
come. Thus, the household could not produce more simply
by reallocating labor or other resources and goods and services
could not be reallocated across household members to make at
least one better oﬀ without making anyone worse oﬀ. Assump-
tions that preferences diﬀer by gender then allow tests of how
men’s and women’s bargaining power aﬀects outcomes. 7
In cooperative bargaining models, a subset of the collective
models, each individual is deﬁned as having an outside option
or a ‘threat point.’ This is the amount of resources that they
could access if they were not part of the household. Each indi-
vidual must obtain at least their outside option within the
household or they will leave. Depending on the context, ‘leav-
ing’ could involve divorce or desertion or it could involve sim-
ply opting out of pooling resources and making joint
decisions. The important policy insight from this model is that
outside options aﬀect household resource allocation. For
example women’s wages aﬀect household resource allocation,
even in households where women are not employed.
A number of studies examine factors that provide women
with bargaining power within the household. Women’s bar-
gaining power may be related to income, assets, and educa-
tion, among others. While endogeneity problems often make
it diﬃcult to establish causal relationships, there is increasing
evidence that women’s bargaining power, using a variety of
proxies, aﬀects the outcomes of household decisions.
A second set of models do not assume that resources are
pooled and explicitly allow for outcomes where these potential
gains have not been realized. While there are many variations
of these models, they typically draw heavily upon the public
goods literature of welfare economics. They model how indi-
viduals contribute to a shared good, such as housing, a farm,
small business, or child rearing. Each individual makes sepa-
rate but interrelated production and consumption decisions
based on his or her own preferences and interests and expecta-
tions of what others will do.
Many studies ﬁnd outcomes that are consistent with nonco-
operative bargaining models. Jones (1983) found that women
contributed less than optimal amounts of labor to household
rice production, preferring to produce lower value sorghum,
since women felt that they were not adequately compensatedwithin the household for their work on irrigated rice ﬁelds.
Udry (1996) found that total household crop yields could have
been increased by shifting fertilizer from men’s ﬁelds to
women’s ﬁelds. McPeak and Doss (2006) found that male
household heads among East African pastoralists located the
household farther from town to limit women’s milk marketing.
The use of experimental games is beginning to illuminate the
processes of household decision-making, particularly regard-
ing the sharing of resources and information and trans-
parency. Recent studies have identiﬁed strategic behavior
between spouses (Ashraf, 2009), couples making choices that
do not maximize surplus (Iversen, Jackson, Kebede, Munro,
& Verschoor, 2010) and that outcomes diﬀer depending on
the process through which income was acquired (Dasgupta
& Mani, 2013).
Much of the empirical work has focused on trying to identify
ineﬃcient outcomes. Some of it was motivated by failed pro-
grams, concluding that the assumptions inherent in cooperative
bargaining models did not hold. The cooperative bargaining
models suggest that policy can inﬂuence the bargaining power
of individuals within the household by shifting their outside
options. The noncooperative bargaining literature indicates
that households do sometimes obtain outcomes that are not
Pareto-eﬃcient. Once it has been established that households
can reach these outcomes, the more pressing question becomes
why they do not cooperate. For example, in Burkina Faso, why
don’t men provide fertilizer to women’s ﬁelds and share in the
additional crop that is produced? And in Northern Kenya,
why don’t women pay their husbands to locate closer to town
so that they can more easily market their surplus milk? 8
To understand this, we would need to examine why some
households are able to obtain cooperative outcomes and
others are not. 9 The literature on collective action, especially
in natural resource management, can provide some insights.
We are interested in identifying policy that can strengthen
the functioning of households and improve the well-being of
everyone within them. The NRM literature has much to oﬀer
in terms of shifting attention to the factors that aﬀect when
and under what circumstances cooperation occurs.3. COLLECTIVE ACTION WITHIN NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Groups of people who depend on common pool resources 10
like irrigation systems, forests, ﬁsheries, and rangelands also
need to work together. The literature on collective action for
natural resource management focuses on problems of provi-
sion (mobilizing labor, cash, or other inputs to invest in, build
up, and manage the natural resources) and allocation (sharing
the resources among the users).
A central concern, especially in much of the early literature,
has been free riding, which in the case of natural resources, can
take two forms: (1) underinvestment because the individual
would bear the costs, but only receive a share of the beneﬁts
or (2) overconsumption and consequent depletion of the
resource because an individual receives all of the beneﬁt from
consumption, but bears only a portion of the cost of its over-
use. Identifying the factors that constrain free ridership was
more than an academic exercise: it has been important for pro-
grams that manage resources with community involvement
(and for other group-based approaches, such as microﬁnance).
Eﬀective community management was seen as an alternative
to (1) state management (which was often not eﬀective at
the local level), (2) privatization of the resources, which
often had negative equity outcomes, and (3) dividing up
Figure 1. Institutional analysis and development framework. Source:
Adapted from Ostrom (2011), Di Gregorio et al. (2012), Pandolfelli
et al. (2007).
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ests) that were better operated as larger units.
There have now been thousands of studies of common prop-
erty regimes demonstrating the sustainable management of the
commons, in some cases over centuries, through collective rules
for resource use and provision. 11 In other cases, resources were
not eﬀectively managed by local groups. This literature
addresses the critical question of what factors aﬀect successful
or unsuccessful collective action for managing the resources.
Many studies of collective management of resources in the
1980s were empirical case studies (e.g., Wade, 1988), followed
by metareviews of case studies (e.g., Ostrom, 1990, 1992;
Tang, 1992; Uphoﬀ, 1986a, 1986b) that attempted to identify
common themes and factors that enabled successful collective
action. Others (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Elster, 1989; Runge, 1986;
and Taylor, 1988) drew on game theory to address these ques-
tions, analyzing how structural conditions aﬀect free ridership.
Many analyses predicting a lack of cooperation focus on the
‘prisoners’ dilemma’: a one-round game with no communica-
tion between players and a payoﬀ structure such that the
rational strategy for each player is to not cooperate. However,
diﬀerent conditions and payoﬀ structures, such as those found
in the ‘assurance game’ or the ‘chicken game,’ are more likely
to lead to cooperation, especially with communication among
players and repeated rounds.
In the 1990s several seminal publications drew together the
empirical and game theory stands of research (e.g., Baland &
Platteau, 1999; Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker,
1994). Together, these studies identiﬁed many factors that
were hypothesized to aﬀect collective action. Although not
always arranged as such, these factors are broadly consistent
with the IAD framework.
To test the factors that were hypothesized from case studies,
metareviews, and game theory, a number of empirical studies
have collected comparable data from a larger number of sites,
to allow quantitative as well as qualitative analysis (e.g.,
Bardhan, 2000; Gebremedhin, Pender, & Tesfay, 2004; Lam,
1998; Meinzen-Dick, Raju, & Gulati, 2002; McCarthy,
Dutilly-Diane´, & Drabo, 2004; Place et al., 2004; Poteete &
Ostrom, 2004). Because the dependent variable (collective
action) is at the level of the user group or community, it is rel-
atively expensive to get enough cases to test the large number
of factors hypothesized.
More recently, both computer-based lab simulations and
games conducted in ﬁeld situations are being used to test
hypotheses about collective action in resource management,
with narratives and payoﬀs simulating resource use (e.g.,
Ca´rdenas, 2003; Ca´rdenas & Ostrom, 2004; Ostrom, 2010;
Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010). These allow researchers
to isolate the eﬀect of particular factors (e.g., changes in a rule)
on behavior, although contextual factors are often needed to
explain these eﬀects (Janssen & Anderies, 2011).
This NRM research is conducted by a wide range of disci-
plines, including economics, political science, sociology,
anthropology, and ecology, as well as many interdisciplinary
studies. Much of this research has both an academic and prac-
tical application, as policymakers and development agencies
are interested in ensuring that communities play a role in
managing local resources.4. OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
The IAD Framework was developed out of the NRM col-
lective action literature. 12 It has been used to conceptualizethe factors aﬀecting collective action. In the following sections,
we show how its applications for discussing collective action
within natural resource management groups can be extended
to address collective action within households.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the IAD framework begins with a
set of initial conditions that inﬂuence the action situation,
which establish patterns of interaction that yield outcomes
that, in turn, can modify the conditions for the next round
of interaction. Much of the collective action literature focuses
on three broad categories of initial conditions (although the
exact labels for the categories vary somewhat). Resource con-
ditions focus on the physical characteristics of the resource
to be managed collectively. Community attributes are the
socioeconomic characteristics of the group to manage the
resource. Institutional arrangements refer to a range of rules
in use and governance arrangements, both formal and infor-
mal. We discuss the speciﬁc factors under each of these cate-
gories, and how they can inﬂuence collective action, in the
next section.
In the action situation, various actors, each with their own
preferences, draw on their action resources for social bargain-
ing—explicit or implicit negotiations that can be between indi-
viduals or groups. Actors include both group members and
outsiders; both those who are and are not bound by the rules
of the group. Action resources are those assets relevant to the
speciﬁc situation that increase the bargaining power of the
actors. They can include tangible assets, such as land or
money, and intangible (and context-speciﬁc) assets such as
time, knowledge, social standing, networks, cognitive sche-
mata (one’s way of thinking about the world), and habitus
(way of carrying oneself and interacting with others) (Di
Gregorio et al., 2012). The ways actors interact and the rela-
tive importance of diﬀerent action resources is shaped by the
rules—formal and informal decision-making arrangements.
For example, in a group that makes decisions based on ﬁnan-
cial or labor contributions, money or labor is an important
action resource, whereas if decisions are made by consensus
in an open meeting, then strong networks to mobilize others
or the ability to speak eloquently would be more important.
Social bargaining in the action situation leads to patterns of
interaction, related to production or consumption, that shape
and reshape the institutional environment. These patterns of
interaction, in turn, result in outcomes that can be evaluated
in terms of their eﬃciency, equity, or other dimensions. The
outcomes then shape the conditions for the next round of
interaction. For example, overharvesting can deplete the
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Group interactions may exclude other potential members,
change the attributes of the community, or establish new rules
or governance arrangements.
This framework is useful in helping us to look within the
‘black box’ of institutions and analyze the factors that shape
collective action. Pandolfelli et al. (2007) applied this IAD
framework to gender and collective action, examining how
gender shapes each element. Work, such as that by Folbre
(1994), examines how gender—and race and class—shape col-
lective action. Her work demonstrated the importance of col-
lective action for shaping the opportunities and constraints
faced by households, but did not treat the household as a col-
lective action unit itself.
One of the key insights from the NRM literature is this
emphasis on how the outcomes at one point shape the oppor-
tunities and constraints in the future. Similarly, the framework
can provide insights into looking within the ‘black box’ of the
household and conceptualizing household behavior and deci-
sions.5. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
In this section we examine how ﬁndings from the literature
on collective action in NRM can provide insights into the
question of collective action within the household, and con-
versely, how the intrahousehold application of these principles
can provide new insights into the study of collective action
within NRM groups. We draw upon several compilations of
the factors aﬀecting collective action, organized according to
the broad categories in the IAD framework, as summarized
in Table 1. We review each of these factors that have been
identiﬁed in the literature on collective action for NRM and
consider what analogous factors might apply to collective
action within the household.
(a) Resource conditions
Studies of collective action for managing resources deal
extensively with how the nature of the resources shapes the
costs and returns to cooperation. Resource characteristics
inﬂuence both the structure of the group and the ease with
which groups can function eﬀectively.
The characteristics of the resource often aﬀect how the man-
agement groups are structured. For example, in irrigation sys-
tems that have main canals feeding secondary and tertiary
distributary canals, water users associations are often orga-
nized as small groups of farmers served by a common outlet,
linked with other such groups who share a common higher
level canal. Forest user groups may be organized by village,
each with rights and responsibilities over a designated forest
area.
A number of physical features of the resource aﬀect the ease
of management. Clear boundaries of the resource units are
generally assumed to make it easier to manage. The degree
of subtractability or rivalry (the extent to which one person’s
use deprives others of the use of the same resource unit) makes
it both more challenging—and more necessary—to work
together and devise rules to sustain the resource. Some
resources are easily divisible (e.g., agricultural ﬁelds) whereas
others have a high degree of jointness (e.g., rangelands, which
tend to be seasonal or heterogeneous; herders need access to
both dry and wet season grazing lands, watering points, and
mineral licks). Agricultural ﬁelds are likely to be divided and
managed by individuals, while in rangelands, herders need towork together to access the resources in diﬀerent areas. In
addition, larger resource units are harder to monitor and more
likely to call for collective management because they do not
fall within the boundaries of an individual farm.
A static snapshot of a resource is not enough. The ﬂow pat-
terns—variability over space and time—are also relevant.
Resources that are mobile—like water or ﬁsh—are more diﬃ-
cult to monitor and manage than those that are stationary,
like forests. Resources are easier to manage collectively if
changes are predictable over time, space, and quantity.
The technologies used for withdrawing resources, excluding
others, and observing or monitoring of the resource are also
important. More eﬃcient harvesting technologies put more
pressure on the resource, and call for stricter rules to limit
depletion. As the costs of excluding others decrease, there is
less incentive for joint management, and more for privatizing,
as seen in the increased privatization of rangeland in the Uni-
ted States once barbed wire reduced the cost of fencing.
Finally, the possibility of substituting one resource for another
reduces the dependence on a single source, and changes the
incentives to manage the resources. For example, when hay
can be substituted for naturally growing grasses and shrubs
to feed livestock, it reduces dependence on rangelands.
At ﬁrst glance there may not seem to be much applicability
of these to the household domain. However, when we consider
that each of these user groups is managing a set of resources
for their livelihoods, then the analogies become more appar-
ent. Households are managing a complex set of resources in
order to produce livelihoods.
As noted above, the agricultural household literature deals
with the links between production and consumption in farm
households. In the case of resource management groups, this
is often referred to as provision and appropriation (Ostrom
et al., 1994). Provision requires groups to organize to create
a resource (e.g., build an irrigation system), maintain it, or
improve its productive capacities; appropriation requires set-
ting the level, timing, location, or technologies for harvesting
or using the resource. In households, provision requires allo-
cating responsibility for eﬀort or inputs to production and
appropriation is the means of distributing the beneﬁts of the
resources and eﬀorts among household members. The nature
of the resources will shape those activities.
As the divisibility of resource units aﬀects group size and
structure in NRM groups, so also the structure of household
resources and economic opportunities aﬀect whether extended
or nuclear families are the norm, and whether living alone is a
viable option. Extended families are more common in agrarian
societies, where farms call for cooperative labor, and subdivi-
sion of farms would make holdings unviable. These can be
considered as nested institutions, akin to the federations of
water users’ associations in irrigations system.
In both NRM groups and households, when resources ﬂuc-
tuate seasonally or annually, they may be associated with
higher levels of risk. People with very risky resource bases,
in either household or group contexts, often invest in social
networks with loosely reciprocal obligations, as a way of
reducing their vulnerability, as seen among pastoral tribes that
have reciprocal access options to the rangeland (Ngaido,
1999), and families that send remittances or assistance to each
other in hard times (Godquin and Quisumbing, 2008). When
household livelihoods depend on more individualized
resources, especially education (individual human capital),
and there are formal insurance mechanisms, smaller families
are more common.
The time lag between when investments are made and
returns are realized will shape the opportunities for collective
Table 1. Factors aﬀecting collective action for resource management, with analogous factors for the household
Natural Resources Management20 Household
Resource
conditions
Structure:
 Clarity of boundaries
 Subtractability/rivalry
 Divisibility/jointness
 Size
Flow patterns:
 Mobility
 Predictability of time, space, quantity
 Possibilities of storage
Condition/capacity of the resource technology
 For withdrawing resources
 For exclusion
 For observability/monitoring
Possibility of substitution
Not concerned with speciﬁc resources, but a set of resources,
social reproduction
Broader economic context:
 Income
 Resources
 Opportunities
 Assets
 Livelihood strategies
 Risk
Community
attributes
Social capital/cohesion
 Number of members
 Boundaries of the group
 Stability/time horizon
- Migration and mobility possibilities
 Past successful/unsuccessful experiences
 Group identity
 Extent of interaction
 Mutual obligations
 Homogeneity/heterogeneity
- Of assets
- Of interests
- Of identity
Human capital
 Health
 Education
 Knowledge of resource
 Leadership
 Dependence on resource
 Competition between alternative organizations
Structures
 Proximity
- Between users
- To resource
 Power structures
 Norms of behavior/culture
Social capital/cohesion
 Number of members
 Household boundaries
 Stability/time horizon of household
- Migration and mobility possibilities
 Family history, stability, economic history
 Family and household identity
 Extent of interaction
 Mutual obligations
 Homogeneity/heterogeneity
- Of assets
- Of interests
- Of identity
Human capital
 Health
 Education
 Individuals’ skills, assets
 Headship
 Independence/jointness of household members’ incomes
 Fallback position/outside options
Structures
 Proximity
- Coresidence
- Proximity to natal home
 Power structures
 Norms of behavior/culture
Institutional
arrangements
Internal
 Decision-making arrangements
 Operational rules
- Member and access rules
- Resource boundary rules
- Appropriation (withdrawing) and provision rules
- Monitoring , sanctioning rules
 Collective choice rules
- Accountability of oﬃcials to users
- Adjudication arrangementsConstitutional rules
- Rules on group formation, registration
External
 Recognition by external agents
 Relationship between users and state
 External rules and intervention
 Ability to change rules
 Adjudication arrangements
 Property rights
 Legal/political environment
 Market penetration
Internal
 Decision-making arrangements
 Operational rules
- Gender patterns of labor
- Who pays for what?
- Attitudes toward domestic violence, conﬂict
 Collective choice rules
- Hierarchy of decision-making, with gender impacts
- Rights and responsibilities
- Conﬂict resolution
 Constitutional rules
- Legal and social rules on marriage, divorce,
household formation
External
 Type of marriage
 State support provided for hhs?
 Laws and social norms
 How does the state intervene in hhs?
 Regulation of domestic violence
 Inheritance
 Tax policies
 Economic context
a This section draws from factors cited by Agrawal (2001), Baland and Platteau (1996), Bardhan (2000), Ostrom (2007), Wade (1988). Sources for each of
the factors are not cited individually.
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176 WORLD DEVELOPMENTaction. For example, managing an existing resource has a
shorter time frame than planting trees which will only bear
fruits in many years. The longer time between investment
and returns makes collective action more diﬃcult, since those
investing may not reap the beneﬁts. A close parallel is house-
holds’ investments in children. While young children may pro-
duce some beneﬁts, including both enjoyment and status for
the parents and grandparents, the economic beneﬁts of raising
children are not realized for many years. Thus, it is a challenge
to ﬁnd ways to work cooperatively to plant trees or raise chil-
dren. While the NRM literature does focus on questions about
how people organize themselves to plant trees, the household
literature usually doesn’t ask about how people organize
themselves to raise children. 13 Instead, it asks about the out-
comes for children; analyzing whether children receive ade-
quate food, education, or health. Research examining
household formation does not usually link to questions of
cooperation.
(b) Community attributes
Turning to the community attributes, many factors inﬂuenc-
ing collective action for managing resources also aﬀect collec-
tive action within the household.
(i) Social capital and cohesion
The number of members of the group and the household
both point to the likely complexity of working together and
to the potential for economies of scale or scope. Clear bound-
aries of the group and stability of group membership over time
are generally expected to facilitate collective action; it is then
easier to assign responsibilities and allocate beneﬁts. With a
longer time horizon, people build trust and are more assured
that they will eventually beneﬁt from investments. Thus, high
migration rates in a community are likely to make it more dif-
ﬁcult to build or maintain collective action.
The degree to which household boundaries are clear and
ﬁxed also varies greatly, especially with polygamy, divorce,
intergenerational households, or extended family and even
unrelated people living in the household. Typically, household
models have considered the bargaining between a husband
and wife. Others model intergenerational bargaining between
a parent and child. But another way to conceptualize more
complicated households is by treating them as a collective
action group.
Concerns about the potential (in)stability of the household
also is a factor for newlyweds, when a patriarch dies, or where
divorce is common. Just as past successful or unsuccessful
experiences with collective action will shape a group’s likeli-
hood of working together, so also family history of stability
or instability aﬀects the degree to which household members
work together for a common purpose. Most empirical work
on the household doesn’t include measures of the stability or
ﬂuidity of the household.
The extent of interaction between group or household mem-
bers also increases cohesion. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) found
that where irrigation units served only one village, there was
more likely to be a water users’ association. Similarly house-
holds that live and work together are likely to have a stronger
sense of cooperation than those with less interaction. Greater
interaction creates multistranded linkages, whereby people
interact not just over the sharing of material resources, but
over social, religious, and other events as well. This generally
builds trust and makes people less likely to try to narrowly
maximize their returns to one joint activity at the expense of
the overall relationship. But—both in communities and house-holds—irritants and disputes from one sphere can spill over
and reduce the likelihood of collective action in other
domains.
Mutual obligations and interdependence among group
members increase the likelihood of collective action. For
example, irrigation systems are notorious for distribution
problems between head and tail of the systems. In traditional
irrigation systems in Nepal which had a diversion weir made
out of materials that wash out in heavy rains, Lam (1998)
found that water sharing was relatively equitable because
head-enders needed the labor and material contributions of
tail-enders to rebuild the weir, or no one would get water.
But when an external program rebuilt the weir out of concrete,
the head-enders were less dependent on the tail-enders, and
hence had less incentive to share the water. There are similar
patterns within the household. For example, Quisumbing
and Otsuka (2001) found that with the introduction of cocoa
in Ghana, men required more of women’s labor to tend the
trees. With this increased interdependence, many men ‘gifted’
land to their wives as an incentive for wives to tend their hus-
bands’ cocoa trees.
Little work in economics has looked at the impact of mutual
obligations and interdependence of relationships on house-
holds functioning. Instead, the issue of dependence is often
treated as one-sided, with women being more dependent on
the relationships than men. A wife’s high degree of depen-
dence may limit her choices, leaving her locked into a relation-
ship. Similarly, some social and economic structures may
increase sons’ dependence, limiting their ability to set up an
independent household. But this is diﬀerent from the notions
of mutual dependence in the collective action literature. A use-
ful area for further research on households is whether mutual
dependence in one area of household activity fosters coopera-
tion in other areas.
There is considerable theoretical and empirical debate about
whether homogeneity or heterogeneity is more conducive to
collective action in NRM (Baland & Platteau, 1999). Review-
ing this literature, McCarthy and Kilic (2015, p. 2) note: ‘Eco-
nomic heterogeneity leads to divergent costs and beneﬁts
across members, and complicates the negotiation of agree-
ments underlying communal contributions. Heterogeneity in
socio-cultural norms and diﬀering degrees of trust across dif-
ferent demographic and ethnic strata can further increase costs
associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agree-
ments.’ Without a shared understanding of the common inter-
ests, it is hard to cooperate in a sustained manner.
Heterogeneity of identity is also problematic, as seen in many
conﬂicts along ethnic lines, because of both diﬀerences in
external labels and internal advantages that a shared culture
provides. However, diﬀerences in assets can facilitate collective
action, especially if wealthy members beneﬁt enough, either
materially or in social or religious standing, for them to bear
a large share of the costs. 14
Within the household, similarly, heterogeneity of assets may
foster cooperation. Becker’s (1993) models of the household
assume that husbands and wives bring diﬀerent assets to the
marriage, primarily skills relevant to the wage sector and
household production and child rearing. The question of
whether heterogeneity of physical and ﬁnancial assets brought
to marriage facilitates cooperative outcomes has not been
addressed. 15 The empirical work on the intrahousehold allo-
cation of resources typically assumes that interests and prefer-
ences diﬀer by gender. Analyses demonstrating that when
women have more bargaining power more of the resources
are spent on children, implicitly assumes these gender diﬀer-
ences. Yet, there is also an implicit assumption that house-
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reproduction.
Strong social norms against marrying outside of one’s social
group suggest that people worry about the heterogeneity of
identity within households. While some of these norms may
be designed to keep resources within a particular ethnic, racial,
or religious community, they are often stated in terms of con-
cern that people with diﬀerent identities and backgrounds will
have diﬀerent expectations and ﬁnd it harder to create a viable
household.
(ii) Human capital 16
The health status of group members has received relatively
little attention in the NRM literature, although illness is likely
to make collective action more diﬃcult, especially where man-
ual labor is required (as for clearing irrigation canals, or
patrolling a forest). Prevalence of major diseases such as
HIV and AIDS may also reduce incentives for collective
action because of heavy discounting of the future beneﬁts
(Haddad & Gillespie, 2001).
However, health problems have also provided the impetus
for organizing or expanding collective action by groups.
GROOTS Kenya is federation of grassroots women’s groups,
many of which started out as AIDS home-based caregiver
organizations, and then expanded their activities into address-
ing women’s property rights and climate-adaptive agricultural
practices to meet the needs of their members dealing with
AIDS. 17 The Bhavani River Protection Joint Council in India
is a civil society movement that was founded in 1994 in
response to women’s concerns with health problems that they
traced to water quality problems. Women participants in mul-
tistakeholder dialogs to improve ﬁsheries in Uganda called for
installation of sanitation facilities to reduce fecal contamina-
tion to improve water quality and human as well as ﬁsh health
(Ratner et al., 2013).
Health has received more attention in the household litera-
ture, especially in the literature on the care economy. 18
Because illnesses are managed within household, being ill
makes one more likely to want to be in a household. The
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa has reshaped many households,
prompting grandparents to care for grandchildren or families
to take in children of other relatives. At the same time, health
shocks are one of the most severe challenges that households
face and the factor most likely to drive them into poverty.
Another element of human capital likely to aﬀect collective
action is education and skills. For example, Meinzen-Dick
et al. (2002) found the presence of college graduates increases
the likelihood of farmers organizing to manage canal irriga-
tion in India. But formal education is not always the most rel-
evant type of human capital for resource management.
Experience with the resource provides important skills and
knowledge. The household literature has given substantial
attention to education as a contributor to women’s bargaining
power, household income, and children’s nutritional status.
However, there is little or no literature on how education or
other forms of human capital aﬀect a household’s likelihood
of cooperation. Both absolute and relative education levels
of household members are likely to play a role, aﬀecting nor-
mative frameworks as well as the fallback options of individ-
uals.
The household literature’s attention to education aﬀecting
bargaining power suggests that NRM groups should consider
how education aﬀects leadership and power relations within
the group and interactions with the formal sector. Although
external programs often recognize only those in formal posi-
tions (e.g., president) as leaders, studies of NRM groups havegone beyond that. In India, Krishna (2004) found that leaders
with connections to outsiders like government agents were
important for successful groups. While many of the
well-known cases of ‘successful’ collective action are associ-
ated with strong individual leaders, it is diﬃcult to identify
the key traits necessary for leadership, much less to say how
to replicate them. Further attention to education may provide
insights into entry points for strengthening local leadership.
The household literature does not usually explicitly address
leadership. It is often implicitly assumed that the ‘head of
household’ is the leader and often deﬁnes the senior adult male
as the head of household. 19 As with NRM groups, leadership
within the household may take many forms. The roles of
mothers or mothers-in-law are relevant for food consumption
decisions and educated youth may aﬀect interactions with new
technologies.
Where all the members of the group depend on a shared
resource for their primary source of livelihood, there is likely
to be greater incentive for cooperation than where many can
‘opt out’ of cooperating, because they have other livelihood
options. Competition between alternative organizations is also
hypothesized to reduce the likelihood of cooperation over
resource management because the organizations are more
likely to be at cross purposes or divert attention from what
needs to be done collectively. The cooperative bargaining
models of the household recognize this explicitly in the identi-
fying the fallback position. Where there are alternatives to
being in a household (such as where it is socially acceptable
and economically viable to live alone), there is less incentive
to cooperate within households. Household studies have
examined this in terms of the fallback options of members
aﬀecting the stability of marriage.
(iii) Structures
Finally, a set of structural characteristics of the user groups,
including both physical and social structures, are hypothesized
to aﬀect collective action in managing resources. The physical
proximity of residence among members of a user group and
the proximity between residences and the resource tend to
reduce the costs of communication among members and the
costs of monitoring or working with the resource. However,
technology plays a role, as the availability of mobile phones
and vehicles makes it easier to communicate and come
together over larger distances. We would similarly expect that
coresidence of household members increases communication
and ties, as seen when comparing joint families with nuclear
families and those with nonresident members. As communica-
tion technologies improve, physical proximity may become
less important. Yet, shared work, whether it is agricultural
production, a business enterprise, or the raising of children,
strengthens the sense of shared purpose.
Although less tangible, social structures and power struc-
tures are no less inﬂuential than physical structures. Caste,
ethnicity, and lineage are a source of bonding within a group,
and may also provide the bases for one group’s power or inﬂu-
ence over another. Within the household, strong patriarchal or
matriarchal social structures will shape household structure
and dynamics. Patrilocal, matrilocal, and uxorilocal residence
patterns inﬂuence the extent to which a couple depends on
each other or the husband’s or wife’s families.
Norms and cultural constructs shape collective action within
communities and households. In NRM, norms about the
resource (e.g., stewardship over the resource as a religious
duty), about preventive maintenance, and about helping one’s
neighbor are but a few examples. In households, religious or
other attitudes toward marriage and family and gendered
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hood of members working and staying together. In both the
NRM and household cases, attitudes and approaches toward
conﬂict also inﬂuence collective action: are disagreements
likely to be suppressed, lead to violence, or are there eﬀective
arbitrators, whether from the state, the community, or family?
(c) Institutional arrangements
The literature on collective action for resource management
pays considerable attention to both the internal (within the
group) and external (outside the group) institutional arrange-
ments and rules, dealing with self-governance as well as with a
range of comanagement arrangements between resource users
and the state. These include both written rules such as consti-
tutions and formal policies as well as unwritten rules such as
social norms that inﬂuence collective action.
Key decision-making arrangements can be examined at
three levels: (Ostrom et al., 1994).
Operational rules govern day-to-day actions. These include
rules on access to the resource, rules deﬁning the boundaries
of the resource that can be accessed by individuals or groups,
the rules relating to appropriation (withdrawing) of the
resource, as well as provision—what each person or group
needs to supply in terms of labor, cash, or materials to invest
in the resource. Monitoring and sanctioning rules have been
identiﬁed as particularly important in the sustainability of
groups as well as sustainability of the resources upon which
they depend. Graduated sanctions, beginning with mild cor-
rection for minor ﬁrst oﬀenses, increasing to serious penalties
for repeated or more egregious oﬀenses, are particularly iden-
tiﬁed with long-enduring resource systems (Ostrom, 1992).
Collective choice rules specify how operational rules can be
set or changed: who is eligible to participate, and how the deci-
sions are to be made. Does a group come together and discuss
matters, or do they have a smaller council or a single
decision-maker? Are rules made by consensus, majority rule,
or imposed by a powerful actor? What is the accountability
of those making or enforcing the rules to the general member-
ship of the group? What adjudication arrangements are there
to deal with disputes?
Constitutional rules, in turn, govern how collective choice
rules are made. Although there is an extensive literature on
the advantages and disadvantages of diﬀerent arrangements
for eﬀective collective action, their suitability depends on a
host of local conditions. However, Ostrom (1990) and others
note that where users are authorized to make decisions about
their own resources, and to change the rules over time, they
are more likely to develop rules that are considered fair and
ﬁt local circumstances, which is especially important when
conditions vary over space and time.
The household literature has given less attention to rules,
and where these are considered, the focus is on externally
deﬁned constitutional rules that aﬀect the formation and dis-
solution of households, and who is considered a member,
rather than on internal decision-making arrangements. While
the institutions internal to households are rarely formalized,
they are very similar to those of NRM groups. Operational
rules identify the responsibilities of each household member
and allocate the beneﬁts. Collective choice rules describe the
decision-making processes. Households typically include both
adults and children, so the power dynamics in decision-making
may be more explicit than in NRM groups. Adults may
include children’s voices in the decision-making process or
exclude them altogether. There tend to be fewer constitutional
rules that are internal to households, but they would includethe rules about who participates in decisions and who is con-
sidered a household member. Much of the literature on
decision-making within the household focuses on identifying
factors that give women voice in the decisions (Kishor &
Subaiya, 2008), rather than identifying the processes of
decision-making. Considering both the content of household
rules and the decision-making processes can help to identify
the mechanisms by which the contributions and needs of dif-
ferent members are mobilized and recognized.
Although the boundaries between internal and external
institutional arrangements are often blurred, it is useful to
think about what rules are set and enforced by those who
are using the resource, and the role of outsiders. Some studies
of forest, irrigation, or wildlife management, for example,
assume government agencies set and enforce the rules, without
recognizing the roles played by local resource users. At the
other extreme, it is possible to idealize community
self-management and focus on internal rules, without recog-
nizing how they are shaped by the state, NGOs, or other
actors. However, most studies of collective action in NRM
recognize the interplay between internal and external forces.
Many groups manage resources collectively without any
form of formal organization. Conversely, many formal regis-
tered associations are not active. But in general, recognition
by external agents, especially the state, strengthens user groups
in managing their resources. Oﬃcial recognition decreases the
likelihood that the outside agents will try to undermine the
collective eﬀorts, and may accord the recognized group with
stronger rights over the natural resources, or access to govern-
ment or NGO assistance.
Similarly, external recognition of a household would gener-
ally be expected to increase its durability. Some couples coha-
bit for many years without any form of marriage, and other
unions dissolve within a short time of formal weddings. How-
ever, a primary function of a marriage ceremony is to recog-
nize the formation of a new household by the family, the
state, and/or society at large. For example, in much of Africa,
there are various forms of recognition and formalization of
relationships, including cohabitation, customary, civil and
religious marriage, each with diﬀerent institutions that rein-
force the union or penalize those who split up. The legal rules
vary by type of marriage. For example, Islamic, Catholic, and
Protestant Christian marriages diﬀer in their structure and
ease of divorce. As in the case of natural resource manage-
ment, recognition also aﬀects the rights that members of a
household have over household property and access to pen-
sions, health insurance, and other programs.
At a broader level, the property rights systems in a country
will aﬀect the incentives and structure for collective action at
both the community and household level. Insecurity of tenure
undermines collective action in either domain. Groups are
more likely to invest in improving a resource (or refrain from
overharvesting) if they have assurance that they will have a
right to the ensuing beneﬁt stream. Privatization or national-
ization of resources reduces incentives for joint investment.
Similarly, the nature of marital property regimes aﬀects the
incentives of men and women in the household to invest in
joint or individually controlled assets. For example, Combs
(2006) discusses how the Married Women’s Property Act in
England resulted in women investing in property that they
owned. However, legal mandates for gender equity may not
necessarily aﬀect the local level if they run counter to tradi-
tional norms, unless the state has very strong enforcement
capacity.
Adjudication arrangements are needed to back up any types
of rights and to settle disputes that may arise. These may be
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Eﬀective and trusted adjudication institutions increase the
likelihood of collective action in the household, family, or
community.
Other aspects of the legal and political environment aﬀect
the likelihood of collective action within NRM groups and
household cohesion. This can include legislation about the
rights of groups to organize or meet. Government agents inter-
act with both NRM groups and households, in both positive
and negative ways. Market penetration has a theoretically
ambiguous eﬀect on collective action. On the one hand, for
resource-dependent communities, expansion of markets may
provide opportunities to raise the value of the resource, mak-
ing it more proﬁtable to manage the resource. On the other
hand, market penetration often provides alternate livelihood
options, reducing the need to depend on the resource base
or each other.
(d) Bargaining in the action situation
The action situation is an area in which the intrahousehold
literature can particularly help to enrich the collective action
literature. Although many discussions of the IAD framework
(e.g., Oakerson, 1992; Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom et al., 1994) did
not disaggregate the action situation, Di Gregorio et al.
(2012) and Pandolfelli et al. (2007) considered that within
the action situation various actors have diﬀerent preferences
and diﬀerent action resources upon which they can draw,
depending on the rules. All of these come together in social
bargaining.
The NRM literature on heterogeneity of interests, discussed
above, is useful in examining the eﬀect of actors’ diﬀerent pref-
erences on the social bargaining. Di Gregorio et al. (2012)
identiﬁed some of the action resources upon which partici-
pants in collective action situations can draw, including not
only tangible resources, human and social capital, but also less
tangible resources such as time and cognitive schemata (men-
tal models). The uses of wealth, education, and social connec-
tions as action resources to inﬂuence the patterns of
interaction are clear in NRM, and have fairly straightforward
applicability in household negotiations. Similarly, those with
more time may be able to negotiate better arrangements.
While cognitive schemata are intangible, they may be impor-
tant: ‘Cognitive schemata, or mental models, deﬁne the bor-
ders of what is imaginable to an actor in both his/her
understanding (knowledge) and normative perspective and
thus provide the limits of what an actor can perceive as feasi-
ble in his/her life’ (Di Gregorio et al., 2012). Religious and
social norms regarding gender clearly inﬂuence what men
and women in diﬀerent ages and classes view as possibilities,
as well as their rewards or sanctions for diﬀerent actions.
For example, in many societies, employment opportunities
for women outside the home broaden their options and bar-
gaining power, but in areas of Bangladesh with strong norms
of female seclusion, women may not consider the possibility of
working outside the home, or if they do, the social stigma
associated with women working overwhelms the potentially
positive impacts on bargaining power.
The household literature deals more extensively with diﬀer-
ent preferences and resources. Many of the empirical models
of the household assume that men and women have diﬀerent
preferences and these diﬀerences in preferences form the basis
for testing the impact of bargaining power and other resources
on outcomes. Men and women may also contribute diﬀerent
assets to the household and this may also aﬀect outcomes
(Deere & Doss, 2006).The NRM literature looks at both external and internal
actors; considering external actors is less common in house-
hold analyses. Yet in both cases, it is not only those who
engage in cooperation that matter. ‘Outsiders’—whether gov-
ernment oﬃcials, NGOs, other communities or households
also take part in the action situations and can inﬂuence the
outcome of social bargaining. For households, the extended
family may be important in the action situations, both provid-
ing pressure for certain outcomes and providing outside
options.
The rules in use aﬀect on how action resources can be
deployed in social bargaining, and on the overall distribution
of beneﬁts. The NRM literature considers both formal rules,
such as government legislative frameworks and bylaws of
the groups, as well as unwritten rules governing the use of
resources. For intrahousehold analyses, family law and social
norms are particularly pertinent. Family law governing mar-
riage formation and dissolution, the rights of diﬀerent mem-
bers of the household, and inheritance patterns shapes
bargaining power. Family law may derive from statutory, cus-
tomary, or religious law, or a mix of these. In addition, local
norms also play a crucial role in determining what resources
are valued and can be deployed. For example, social norms
on women’s roles and female seclusion will aﬀect the value
placed on women’s education. And domestic violence is an
accepted action resource is some households and societies
but not in others.
Although action situations involve social bargaining, the
emphasis in the NRM literature has been on the joint or col-
lective outcomes, rather than on the distribution of costs and
beneﬁts. Conversely, the household literature has dealt more
extensively with bargaining, with a focus on distributional out-
comes, and an explicit or implicit emphasis on improving the
outcomes for women. In some cases, the emphasis on women
is treated primarily as an equity issue, where women have been
particularly disadvantaged. But attention to improving out-
comes for women has also been justiﬁed as improving overall
productivity or the welfare of children (see, for example, FAO
(2011); Quisumbing (2003)), which can be seen as a collective
good at the household, or even the national level.
The IAD framework’s explicit attention to multiple evalua-
tive criteria is important in this regard. While eﬃciency is a
common (external) criterion for both NRM and households,
equity and sustainability (of the resource base or the house-
hold unit) are also important. While biophysical measurement
of trees and anthropometric measures of children are very dif-
ferent, both provide indicators of the future resource base.
Other indicators of satisfaction and welfare are also worth
considering, particularly when suggested as an objective by
people themselves.6. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMPARISON
Both NRM groups and households face collective action
challenges. Yet the research on these conceptualizes and ana-
lyzes these challenges in very diﬀerent ways. The overarching
questions in the NRM literature are about the management
of the resource, whether it is water, a forest, or a rangeland.
But in the household literature, the questions are about the
household members, not their resources, and the outcomes
are typically measures of household or individual well-being.
Only the NRM literature explicitly frames these challenges
as collective action issues, but each set of literature has impor-
tant lessons to learn from the other. We can consider three sets
of ways in which these literatures challenge each other. First is
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framework. Second, is to consider potential policy interven-
tions and how we might implement and evaluate them. And
ﬁnally, there are a number of speciﬁc issues that are central
in one literature and not the other.
First, the IAD framework suggests a way to resolve the
problem of the household and intrahousehold literature which
typically looks at bargaining between two people within the
household. It suggests that we can consider the household as
a group that is seeking provision and allocation of resources
across its members, who have diﬀerent levels of leadership
and decision-making. This approach can accommodate
nuclear families or extended, polygamous families. It also rec-
ognizes that households, like other institutions, have a range
of desired outcomes, which may actually conﬂict with each
other. And it takes for granted that the individuals within
households may share some, but not all, of the same interests.
The NRM literature asks diﬀerent questions than the house-
hold literature and can encourage us to reformulate our ques-
tions. In particular, it suggests that it might be fruitful to ask
what enables households to reach cooperative outcomes. This
could have direct policy implications, helping us to think
through what types of policy interventions can support coop-
eration within the household as well as the community.
Within the household literature, it is important to think
beyond the economists’ deﬁnition of cooperative outcomes.
Some of the literature simply asks whether the outcome is Par-
eto eﬃcient—whether all of the beneﬁts from cooperation have
been reached and no one can be made better oﬀ without mak-
ing someone else worse oﬀ. But an outcome where one person
had all of the beneﬁts and the other had none would be consid-
ered a cooperative outcome. It does not consider distributional
concerns. Instead, we need to incorporate some subjective mea-
sures of how to support everyone in the household and create
environments where everyone in the household can ﬂourish.
The NRM literature is explicitly dynamic, while the house-
hold literature is much less so. This is seen not only in the con-
ceptual frameworks but also in the game theory and
experimental games used: one-shot games are less likely to
lead to cooperative outcomes than repeated games. A dynamic
framework may help to explain some of the puzzles of the
household literature. For example, earlier we wondered why
women don’t purchase fertilizer for their ﬁelds from the men
in their households or why women don’t compensate men
for locating closer to town so that they can market milk.
The answer may be a dynamic story, with men resisting
changes that provide women with greater resources, to prevent
women from using those resources to bargain for more equita-
ble outcomes in later periods. The feedback loops in the IAD
model provide insights into why such patterns may persist—
and how they can change.
The two literatures vary in terms of what they consider to be
the outcome measure or dependent variable. In the NRM lit-
erature, the action itself may be considered the outcome. It
may also be considered an intermediate outcome or the means
to the end. But the intrahousehold literature has not looked at
cooperation as an outcome.
There are many challenges with treating the action itself as
an outcome. Often it is measured simply as whether or not a
collective action group exists, or meetings are held, rather than
determining whether or not the group actually works together
cooperatively. However, the International Forestry Resources
and Institutions (IFRI) research network has devised elabo-
rate protocols for consistently measuring conditioning factors,
rule structures, collective action, and outcomes in terms of the
resource base. Building such a comprehensive database forexamining factors aﬀecting collective action in forestry allows
for cross-cultural comparisons as well (e.g., Coleman &
Mwangi, 2013; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Wollenberg,
Merino, Agrawal, & Ostrom, 2007). Similar methodological
development for comparative empirical analysis of collective
action in the household could also yield rich results if based
on the factors identiﬁed in Table 1.
Second, bringing together these two sets of literature has
some important policy implications. The ﬁrst lies in the fram-
ing of discussions of the household and interventions designed
to address intrahousehold relations, especially to promote gen-
der equality. Many of these policies and interventions have tar-
geted women, seeking to strengthen their incomes or
bargaining power. This framing implies a zero-sum game,
and can lead to opposition or backlash from men. By contrast,
framing the policies or interventions as seeking to strengthen
collective action for shared gains can gain greater support from
men as well as women. Children’s welfare is often one of the
household ‘public goods’ that can be highlighted for coopera-
tion. For example, a household garden project by Hellen Keller
International in Burkina Faso emphasized improving maternal
and child nutrition, but contributed to changes in attitudes that
favored women’s access to and control over land (van den
Bold, Pedehombga, Ouedraogo, Quisumbing, & Olney, 2015).
Designing policy interventions to strengthen cooperation
and collective action among household members points in
new directions. For example, in both the NRM and household
literature, the deﬁnition and recognition of the relevant
‘group’ has both research and policy implications. We usually
deﬁne a household by its activities. Thus a household is
deﬁned as a group of people living or eating together, regard-
less of the formality of their relations. It may be a loosely
deﬁned group of people connected by kinship or friendship.
Or it may be based on the formal marriage of a man and a
woman with their children. Some NRM studies focus on
groups that have a formal structure; often those that are for-
mally registered with the authorities, but other types of collec-
tive action groups may be more relevant for managing
resources. As with households, so also with NRM groups:
What matters is who is together, not just the legal deﬁnition.
Legal recognition can reinforce a marriage and a NRM group
by conferring speciﬁc state-recognized rights. However, if the
hurdles to getting state recognition are too high, couples will
live together and groups will manage together without the
recognition. Policies that make recognition aﬀordable and
accessible are therefore important in both sectors.
Finally, there are a number of speciﬁc issues for which it
becomes apparent that they are missing from one literature
when we read the other. The intrahousehold literature takes
for granted heterogeneity of age and sex within households
and asks how it matters. The empirical work either looks at
the bargaining decision between a husband and wife or
between generations. Thus, we expect that both gender and
age will play important roles in household decision-making.
While there is some work on gender and NRM (Agarwal,
2010; Coleman & Mwangi, 2013; Resurreccion & Elmhirst,
2008; Valdivia & Gilles, 2001), the literature would be
strengthened if gender were explicitly considered as a matter
of routine. But the household literature has not dealt as exten-
sively with economic and socio-cultural heterogeneity, and
how that might aﬀect collective action; this is an area where
the NRM literature can provide insights.
The NRM literature has relatively little on the health of
group members or of how education aﬀects leadership and
power within the group. Both of these issues are central in
the literature on household and intrahousehold issues. The
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enrich the NRM literature.
Speciﬁc issues missing from the household literature include
how the nature of the resource base aﬀects collective action.
For example, how do diﬀerent types of livelihood risks aﬀect
household structure and the need for cooperation, both
between men and women and across generations?
Although households are composed of multiple individuals,
much of the literature focuses on dyadic relationships, whereas
the NRM literature has done more to address interactions
among larger groups, and between levels of nested institutions.
Drawing from this literature can improve household analyses,
especially of extended family and kinship structures.
The household literature has also paid less attention to the
operational, collective choice, and constitutional rules of dif-
ferent types of households. Yet both the speciﬁc rules and
the decision-making arrangements can play an important role
in shaping incentives to cooperate. The NRM literature sug-
gests that participation in decision-making increases coopera-
tion and rule compliance, and that when users with knowledge
of the resource shape the rules, outcomes for the resource are
improved. It is worth investigating whether more participatory
household decision-making similarly contributes to greater
cooperation, as well as productive outcomes, especially in agri-
cultural households where men and women have diﬀerent roles
and knowledge of the resources.
Neither set of literature adequately addresses the issue of
power relations among the individuals. The intrahousehold lit-
erature does examine ‘bargaining power’ which is often prox-
ied by education or age diﬀerentials. To the extent that one’s
outside options are determined by power relations within soci-
ety, they are implicitly considered within some of these mod-
els. Several feminist economists explore how the broader
community and societal rules and norms impact household
decision making (Agarwal, 1997; Folbre, 1994), but these are
typically not included in the models. The NRM literature sim-
ilarly examines elite capture, but often does not consider how
power is exercised to enable elite capture.
Both literatures would beneﬁt from considering other
aspects of power relations among individuals. The action
resources identiﬁed in the IAD framework suggests factors
that aﬀect bargaining power, along with how the structure
of (written and unwritten) rules aﬀect the value of diﬀerentaction resources. Sen (1990) encourages us to consider how
capabilities and perceptions impact the range of choices that
individuals see as options. This is consistent with notions of
human capital and cognitive schemata as action resources,
and provides insights into both household decisions and the
roles that people play within collective action groups. One
challenge is that even when researchers ask questions about
these types of power relations, the empirical variables that
they use are similar to the ones discussed above, such as edu-
cation and age diﬀerences. Further qualitative research is
needed to identify the key perceptions and action resources.7. CONCLUSION
A discussion between the NRM collective action literatures
and the household and intrahousehold literatures suggests
some fruitful areas for future research. Considering house-
holds as institutions engaged in collective action provides a
way to address some of the challenges facing this literature
and move to ways to understand the processes through which
households make decisions. It also provides a means to go
beyond dyadic relationships to address the fact that house-
holds may be composed of multiple people of diﬀerent gener-
ations, abilities to contribute, and needs.
Instead of trying to identify whether or not households
reach eﬃcient outcomes, with eﬃciency deﬁned quite nar-
rowly, a collective action approach would support considering
a range of potential outcomes for households and would focus
on determining what types of other social and government
institutions may support or discourage household members
reaching desired outcomes.
Reading the household literature in the context of the NRM
collective action literature also suggests that the NRM litera-
ture would be strengthened by greater emphasis on human
capital issues, including gender, health, and education. Under-
standing household dynamics, restrictions on mobility, and
the resources that men and women control can also enrich
our understanding gender patterns in collective NRM activi-
ties. And those working in both arenas need to strongly con-
sider the power relationships that go on within all
institutions, whether they are natural resource management
groups or households.NOTES1. Each of these two sets of literature is extensive. We do not propose
to review the literature in detail, but instead to highlight the key areas
where one literature can illuminate the other, drawing on key pieces
from each literature, especially those that synthesize a broader set of
studies. Furthermore, our focus in this paper is on the theoretical and
quantitative studies from both bodies of literature, rather than the
qualitative studies.
2. We will use the term household literature to refer both to the broader
literature on households and the literature speciﬁcally on intrahousehold
issues.
3. For example, Deaton’s (1989) synthesis of the literature on savings,
consumption, and intertemporal choices asks about aggregation up to the
economy level, but not aggregation of individuals into a household.
4. Early work in this area includes Dey (1981) and Carney (1988).
Quisumbing (2003) provides a good synthesis of the household
decision-making literature.5. See Haddad, Hoddionott, and Alderman (1997) for an excellent
discussion of these issues.
6. See Doss (2013) for a review of this literature.
7. If the preferences did not diﬀer by gender, we would not see gendered
patterns of outcomes based on bargaining power.
8. These transactions within the household would not have to be in cash,
but could be in other goods, services, or favors.
9. In much of the economics literature, a cooperative outcome is one that
is Pareto eﬃcient; where the same resources couldn’t be used to produce
more output or where the resources couldn’t be reallocated to make one
person better oﬀ without making someone else worse oﬀ.
10. Common pool resources, such as irrigation systems, forests, or
rangelands are characterized by high subtractability and low excludability.
That is, one person’s use of the resource reduces its availability to others
182 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(subtractability or rivalry), but it is diﬃcult to keep people from using it
(non-excludability).
11. See the Digital Library of the Commons, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/
dlc/.
12. For a review of the IAD framework, see Ostrom (2011). In the
remainder of this article, we use the version as adapted by Di Gregorio
et al. (2012) and Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick, and Dohrn (2007), because it
includes speciﬁc reference to the preferences and action resources of
diﬀerent actors. Some category headings have also been modiﬁed to
highlight the applicability to household cooperation.
13. An exception to this is Folbre (1994) who considers how societies
organize to provide for children.
14. The issue of possible complementarity of diﬀerent types of assets,
which has been explored more in the household literature, has received
relatively little attention in the NRM literature.15. There is a literature on physical and ﬁnancial assets brought to
marriage and how it aﬀects bargaining power within the household; see
Quisumbing (2003) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003).
16. Human capital is one domain where the household literature
gives more explicit attention than the NRM literature. However, many
of the characteristics of user groups that are hypothesized to aﬀect
NRM relate to aspects of human capital. We group them under this
heading to show the potential links between the two bodies of
literature.
17. See http://gatunducommunityinitiatives.blogspot.com/2011/01/inter-
section-of-land-rights-and-spread.html.
18. Surveys of this literature include: Friedemann-Sa´nchez and Griﬃn
(2011), and Razavi (2011).
19. For critiques of assumptions about headship, see Buvinic´ and Gupta
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